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IN THE SUPREME COURT 3F THE 
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vs. ] 
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CORPORATION, a Utah ] 
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Appellant. ] 
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| 860099-CA 
i SUPREME COURT NO. 
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1 (CATEGORY 13) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court granted Appellant's petition for writ of 
certiorari by an order dated January 11, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant, North Ogden Professional Corporation, hereafter 
referred to as "Corporation," appeals from the Court of Appeals' 
order sustaining the District Court's judgment ordering Corpora-
tion's dissolution. The Corporation seeks reversal of the 
judgment and enforcement of its alleged claim to redeem certain 
shares of its stock held by Plaintiff, Edward Riche, hereafter 
referred to as "Riche," for $1,000. 
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The Court of Appeals' statement of the facts is accurate 
except for a brief clarification that follows hereafter: 
On June 8, 1970, three medical doctors, Dr. Richard 
Nilsson, Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, and Dr. David 
Paul, formed defendant corporation under the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
16-11-1 to -15 (1987). The corporation's articles 
of incorporation authorized the issuance of 50,000 
shares of stock with a par value of $1,00 per 
share.' The corporation issued 1,000 shares to Dr. 
Nilsson, 1,000 to Dr. Michaelson, and 10 sharer to 
Dr. Paul. The articles of incorporation restricted 
the transfer of stock, permitting transfer only to 
other members of the medical profession. On July 1, 
1970, the shareholders and the corporation entered 
into a stock redemption agreement, which also 
restricted the transfer of stock and gave the 
corporation a right of first refusal should any 
shareholder desire to dispose of his stock and the 
option to repurchase its stock at par value in the 
event of the death of a shareholder or upon a 
shareholder's termination of employment by the 
corporation. 
Dr. Nilsson became involved in several unsuccessful 
investments, culminating in his filing for bank-
ruptcy in 1976. On November 20, 1981, the bankrup-
tcy trustee applied to the bankruptcy court for 
authorization to sell Dr. Nilsson's 1,000 shares of 
stock in the cqrporation to Dr. Michaelson for 
$1,000. This amount represented the par value of 
the shares and the amount for which the corporation 
would be entitled to redeem the shares, pursuant to 
the stock redemption agreement, in the event it was 
entitled to redeem. Riche, a creditor of Dr. 
Nilsson holding a judgment for $120,000, objected 
and asked the bankruptcy court to require the 
trustee to force a dissolution- of the corporation 
so that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate could 
receive his share of the total assets of the 
corporation. 
The bankruptcy court rejected both suggestions. 
Instead, the court authorized a sale of the stock 
to the highest bidder and, on August 12, 1982, 
conducted a sale of the stock. The bidding 
proceeded in stages until Riche bid $2,600 and Dr. 
Michaelson refused to make a higher bid. The court 
authorized the sale of Dr. Nilsson's shares to 
Riche for that amount. In doing so, the bankruptcy 
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court in no way .ruled on the validity of the 
transfer or value of the stock and expressly made 
the sale "subject to,f any applicable restrictions 
in the stock redemption agreement and articles of 
incorporation and all applicable provisions of 
state law. 
Upon sale of the stock to Riche, the corporation 
tendered $1,000 to Riche, the par value of the 
shares of stock purchased from the trustee, in 
contemplation of the stock redemption agreement. 
(This is the only part Riche takes exception to. 
See below.) Riche rejected the tender and made 
demand upon the corporation for the issuance of the 
1,000 shares of stock, redemption of his shares of 
the corporation for their fair market value, a 
corporate financial statement, and an opportunity 
to inspect a copy of the corporate minutes, bylaws, 
and articles of incorporation. The corporation 
refused to comply with Riche's demands and re-
iterated its perceived right to repurchase the 
stock at par value. 
Riche then filed an action in district court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 16-11-13 (1987) , 
which provided that, absent a redemption provision 
to the contrary, a professional corporation has 90 
days within which to purchase the shares of a 
disqualified shareholder at their "reasonable fair 
value." Absent such purchase, an action may be 
filed to obtain the "reasonable fair value" of 
the shares or the corporation's dissolution. Id. 
Following trial, the court found that once Riche 
purchased all the rights, title, and interest that 
Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate had in the 1,000 
shares of stock, Riche was entitled, under both the 
stock redemption agreement and Sec. 16-11-13, to 
have his shares redeemed for their reasonable fair 
value. The court found that dissolution was the 
only viable solution. It ordered defendant 
corporation to be immediately dissolved and to have 
all its assets marshalled, its legal liabilities 
paid, and the balance of its assets distributed to 
the shareholders in the same ratio as their 
respective stock ownerships. The court also 
entered judgment against the corporation for 
reasonable attorney fees as required by the 
statute. Edward A. Riche v. North Qgden Profes-
sional Corporation, Case No. 860099-CA, pp. 1, 2, 
3. 
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The only clarification of the above stared facts is that 
Riche asserts the stock was purchased on x\ugust 12, 1982 as 
stated above and shortly thereafter made demand to redeem. The 
corporation made its first tender into the court of $1,000 as a 
part of its answer to Riche's complaint filed September 23, 1983. 
(R. pp. 10,11) 
The Court of Appeals found in its findings that the state 
law, the corporate articles, and the agreement taken as a whole 
all restricted the voluntary transfer of the corporate stock to 
unlicensed medical professionals. The Court of Appeals cited Utah 
Code Annotated Section 16-11-7 (1987), the restrictions of the 
corporation's articles and the stock repurchase agreement as 
equivalent restrictions which prohibit voluntary transfers. 
Although the voluntary restrictions exist in the agreement 
the Court of Appeals found that the transfer as ordered by the 
Bankruptcy Judge was an involuntary transfer, not within the 
restriction of state statute, corporate articles nor the repur-
chase agreement. (Emphasis added) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Riche asserts two issues: 
1. SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS' FINDING THAT THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF THE STOCK REPURCHASE AGREEMENT "DOES NOT EVEN PURPORT 
TO RESTRICT INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK, SUCH AS THE ONE IN 
THE INSTANT CASE..." BE SUSTAINED RESULTING IN THE DISSOLUTION OF 
THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
4 
16-11-13 (1987)? 
2. IN THE EVENT THIS COURT REVERSES AND FINDS THE 
RESTRICTIONS OF THE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT APPLICABLE, DID THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION BY ITS TENDER COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH THEN WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE 
CORPORATION'S REDEMPTION OF THE SHARES FOR $1,000? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Riche asserts two arguments why this Court should sustain 
the lower courts: 
(1) Riche acquired the shares of the Corporation as a 
result of a court-ordered transfer. The plain meaning of the 
repurchase agreement restricts voluntary transfers, but not the 
manner by which Riche received his shares. At Riche's request, 
the Corporation failed to redeem his shares for reasonable fair 
value. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 16-11-13 (1987), dissolution 
is the only other alternative. 
(2) Should this Court find, however, the repurchase 
agreement applies, then Riche asserts that the Corporation failed 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the repurchase 
agreement and did not make a timely tender. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS' FINDING 
THAT THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STOCK REPURCHASE 
AGREEMENT "DOES NOT EVEN PURPORT TO RESTRICT 
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK, SUCH AS THE ONE IN 
THE INSTANT CASE..." BE SUSTAINED RESULTING IN THE 
DISSOLUTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION UNDER 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 16-11-13 (1987)? 
Riche's declared position from the Bankruptcy Court to the 
trial court has always been that the stock repurchase agreement 
restricted voluntary transfer (T. p. 5), however, the trial court 
found for Riche for somewhat different reasons. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order of dissolution by simply 
reviewing the stock repurchase agreement and applying what the 
Court of Appeals calls the agreement's "plain meaning." 
[Emphasis added] (Opinion attached, p. 7) In fact, the Court of 
Appeals7 specific language is: 
The agreement does not even purport to restrict 
involuntary transfers of stock, such as the one in 
the instant case which occurred pursuant to a court 
ordered trustee's sale." (Opinion p. 7) 
The Court of Appeals then cites Durkee v. Durkee-Mower, 
Inc. , 428 NE 2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1981) and continues in its 
opinion: 
The restrictions . in the stock redemption agreement 
only concern (1) transfers upon the death of a 
shareholder and (2) voluntary transfers during 
life. 
The forenamed Court was unwilling to "... reach the 
question of whether, and to what extent, intended restrictions on 
involuntary transfers might be enforceable." (Opinion p.7) 
As if to stress its interpretation, the Court of Appeals 
cited Durkee again, making it a vital part of the opinion: 
[T]he scope of the restriction cannot be greater 
than its actual language... 
and with a resounding emphasis added: 
Accordingly, [w]e refuse to expand the clear and 
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unambiguous language of the corporate stock 
restriction and hold it applicable to a situation 
not provided for when drafted. Id. p.7 
Using language cited, above the forenamed Court readily 
sustained the trial court's judgment for reasons somewhat 
different than relied upon by the trial court but cited Buehner-
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah i988) for 
the principle that an appellate court ..."may affirm a trial 
court's decisions on proper ground(s) despite trial court's 
having assigned another reason for its ruling". 
In view of the lower Court's findings Riche asks this 
Court to review the following relevant language: 
RESTRICTION ON STOCK. If any Shareholder at any 
time desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise 
dispose of any of his stock of the Company, or if 
any Shareholder shall terminate his employment by 
the Company, he shall offer all his stock to the 
Company at par value by written notice addressed to 
the principal office of the Company. (Stock 
Redemption Agreement, pp. 1, 2) 
and determine if the plain meaning of the language may restrict 
involuntary transfers. The language seems clear that the 
Corporation is offered a right of first refusal whenever a 
shareholder "desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of 
his shares." Id. This language clearly exhibits a voluntary 
disposition as opposed to a court-ordered sale in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
Especially is this concept brought more in focus consider-
ing that the two principal shareholders, Drs. Nilsson and 
Michaelson, understood among themselves that each owned his own 
accounts receivable. (T. pp. 26, 27, 28, 92) Each testified at 
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trial that in their minds each doctor owned his receivable and 
the only assets transferred for $1,000 would consist of bookkeep-
ing equipment, desks, typewriters, etc. (T. p. 92) 
Even with Dr. Nilsson's understanding that the accounts 
receivable belonged to him, he did not place them on his bank-
ruptcy schedule. (T. p. 29) 
Riche, from the beginning, as a creditor of the bankrupt's 
estate, asked the trustee to dissolve the corporation so that all 
creaitors might share pro-rata in the receivables. The Bankruptcy 
Court considered Riche's request, chose, however, to sell 
whatever interest the trustee had to Riche as the highest bidder. 
Riche seeks this Court's confirmation of the plain meaning 
contained in the agreement as found by the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner, (Appellant's Brief, p. 13) cited Renberg v. Zarrow, 
667 P. 2d 465 (Okla. 1983) as a case more in point. An indepth 
review of the case stands for the time-honored proposition that 
given the normal circumstances, buy-sell agreements between 
informed parties and their representatives are enforceable. 
Riche takes no exception to this general principle. The Renberq 
case also extends the principle that two informed parties were 
bound by their buy-sell agreement even though there was a large 
disparity between the market price and the agreed upon buy-sell 
price. The large disparity in price was cited by the court as 
insufficient cause to invalidate the buy-sell agreement. Id p. 
470 Riche's case is distinguished by the Appellate Court's 
finding of clear and unambiguous language that excludes involun-
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tary transfers within the restrictions of the agreement. 
Therefore, Riche finding himself with unrestricted shares and an 
unwilling Corporation to redeem them for reasonable fair value, 
is entitled by law for an order from this court affirming the 
lower court's order of dissolution pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
tated Section 16-11-13 (1987). 
Point 2: IN THE EVENT THIS COURT REVERSES AND 
FINDS THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT 
APPLICABLE, DID THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION BY 
ITS TENDER COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
THE AGREEMENT WHICH THEN WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE 
CORPORATION'S REDEMPTION OF THE SHARES FOR $1,000? 
Assuming, for argument's sake, the Corporation had the 
right to redeem Dr. Nilsson's shares for $1,000 under the 
agreement. The agreement itself has certain preconditioned, 
common notices, and options that the parties are bound to follow. 
Given the undisputed facts Dr. Nilsson failed to offer his shares 
to the corporation prior to his bankruptcy and the Corporation 
took no action on its own behalf until the trustee in bankruptcy 
made a second request dated June 24, 1982 (R. p. 55) for per-
mission to offer the shares for a higher bid. Permission was 
granted and solicitation for higher bids was made, and the stocks 
sold to Riche. This was completed on September 20, 1982. Riche 
made demand for redemption under a letter dated October 11, 1982 
(R. p. 83). The Corporation took no action and Riche, nearly a 
year later, filed in a lower court for an order of dissolution 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 16-11-13 (1987). 
The Corporation filed its answer to Riche's complaint on 
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September 21, 1983, almost, a year after Riche had obtained his 
rights to the shares. As a part of the Corporation's answer, 
petitioner for the first time tendered its $1,000 in the 
District Court, claiming its redemptive rights. From the time 
Dr. Nillsson filed bankruptcy in 1976 to the time the Corporation 
filed its answer in September of 1983, the entire record, as it 
relates to the Corporation, is void of any other clear effort 
made by the Corporation to exercise its alleged rights to redeem. 
There was talk of redemption but no actual tender. 
The trial court, in its Finding number 16 stated: 
Although the redemption agreement provides for 
notices and procedural steps, no such steps or 
procedures were followed or taken by defendant. 
Number 2 4 of the lower Court's Finding continues: 
There has been no redemption under the terms of the 
stock redemption agreement, or under the provisions 
of Code Section 16-11-13. Therefore, under the 
terms of the redemption agreement and Code Section 
16-11-13 this Court concludes that all of the 
evidence mandates that dissolution is the only 
viable solution under Utah law. . . [Emphasis 
added] (R. 275-276) and (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law attached, pp. 2,7) 
If the Corporation had a right to redeem, the evidence is-
overwhelming that procedural, implementing steps or options and 
terms of the agreement were ignored. Therefore, the Corporation 
breached the agreement, forfeited its alleged rights of redemp-
tion, and Riche is entitled to an order affirming all the lower 
court's rulings. 
To rule otherwise would, in effect, allow Dr. Nilsson the 
elimination of all his debts through his bankruptcy and gain 
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control of his receivables (in excess of $200,000) (R. p. 23) and 
gain other minor assets of the Corporation. The effect: is a 
judicially sanctioned exemption, obtainable simply by entering 
into a buy-sell agreement shortly prior to bankruptcy at a 
substantially reduced price. Respondent does not suggest that 
Dr. Nilsson from the beginning set up this elaborate procedure 
to gain these benefits. Nevertheless, he will gain these 
benefits unless this Court affirms the lower Courts. This is 
because of the lower Court's Finding number 4 which states there 
are "considerable assets" in the Corporation, and while the 
Corporation existed in the eyes of the general public, the two 
doctors ignored the formal paperwork and considered that each 
owned, after the payment of expenses, one-half of all the 
receivables. (Findings of Fact No. 4, p. 2) The relationship 
between the two principal doctors was extremely close. In fact, 
the trial Court found that each promoted the welfare of the 
other. Number 12 of the Court's Findings states in part: 
12. All the evidence of this case taken as a whole 
warrants a finding of fact that Dr. Nilsson and Dr. 
Michaelson have jealously attempted to promote one 
another's well being. Further, there is no 
evidence of a falling out or opposing positions 
taken by Dr. Nilsson and/or Dr. Michaelson with 
regard to one another and their respective welfare. 
The evidence is actually to the opposite in the 
extreme. Insofar as Dr. Michaelson is concerned, 
his efforts appear to be totally honest. 
Given this relationship and the lower Court's findings it 
is not difficult to assume Dr. Nilsson would be restored fully 
for $1,000. 
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CONCLUSION 
The basic facts are not in dispute. Riche asks the Court 
to read the redemption agreement and apply the plain meaning of 
the words, given the Court of Appeals' ruling. 
In the unhappy event this Court differs with the lower 
courts, and determines the agreement applies to involuntary 
transfers, this Court must then look at the terms and conditions 
of the agreement and determine whether the Corporation complied. 
Petitioner (Appellant's Brief, p. 19) states the Corporation made 
a timely tender, and yet fails to produce any such credible evi-
dence. If an agreement exists Petitioner breached the terms and 
conditions and should not now be allowed the rights under the 
repurchase agreement. Conscience dictates under the lower 
Court's Findings that Dr. Nilsson, in effect, ought not to be 
allowed the benefits of his bankruptcy and the receivables 
returned to his possession for $1,000. 
Finally, in view of the filed briefs and arguments this 
Court may want to reconsider whether or not certiorari was 
improvidently granted. Israel Pagan Estate v. Capitol Thrift and 
Loan, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (filed March 17, 1989). 
DATED this /^^dav of April, 1989. 
^Z^^^y^^^<^1 
P. 5AMPS0N^ 
*Blvd., !B50 Washington l ., #102 
Obden, UT 84401 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f / R e s p o n d e n t 
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ADDiiu'DUM 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act provides: 
A professional corporation may 
issue the shares of its capital stock 
only to persons who are duly licensed to 
render the same specific professional 
services as those for which the corpo-
ration was organized. A shareholder may 
voluntarily transfer his shares in a 
professional corporation only to a 
person who is duly licensed to render 
the same specific professional services 
as those for which the corporation was 
organized. Any shares issued in vio-
lation of this section are void. 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act provides: 
The articles of incorporation may 
provide for the purchase or redemption 
of the shares of any shareholder upon 
the death or disqualification of such 
shareholder, cr the same may be provided 
in the by-laws or by private agreement. 
In the absence of such a provision in 
the articles of incorporation, the 
by-laws, or by private agreement, the 
professional corporation shall purchase 
the shares of a deceased shareholder or 
a shareholder no longer .qualified to own 
shares in such corporation within 90 
days after the death of the shareholder 
or disqualification of the shareholder, 
as the case may be. The price for such 
shares shall be their reasonable fair 
value as of the date of death or dis-
qualification of the shareholder. If 
the corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shares by the end of said 90 days, 
then the executor or administrator or 
other personal representative of a 
deceased shareholder or any disqualified 
shareholder may bring an action in the 
district court of the county in which 
the principal office or place of prac-
tice of the professional corporation is 
located for the enforcement of this 
provision. The court shall have power 
to award the plaintiff the reasonable 
fair value of his shares, or within its 
jurisdiction, may order the liquidation 
of the corporation. Further, if the 
plaintiff is successful in such action, 
he shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneyfs fee and costs. 
The professional corporation shall 
repurchase such shares without regard to 
restrictions upon the repurchase of 
shares provided by zhe Utah Business 
Corporation Act. 
\^i\iZ ^J X J. _ Jil. . 
Edward A. Riche, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Edward A. Riche, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v
* ) 
North Ogden Professional ) 
Corporation, a Utah ) Case No. 860099-CA 
professional corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant, North Ogden Professional Corporation, appeals 
from a district court judgment ordering its dissolution. The 
corporation seeks reversal of the judgment and enforcement of its 
claimed right to redeem certain shares of its stock held by 
plaintiff Edward Riche. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On June 8, 1970, three medical doctors, Dr. Richard Nilsson, 
Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, and Dr. David Paul, formed defendant 
corporation under the Utah Professional Corporation Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-11-1 to -15 (1987). The corporation's articles of 
incorporation authorized the issuance of 50,000 shares of stock 
with a par value of $1.00 per share. The corporation issued 
1,000 shares to Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 to Dr. Michaelson, and 10 
shares to Dr. Paul. The articles of incorporation restricted the 
transfer of stock, permitting transfer only to other members of 
the medical profession. On July 1, 1970, the shareholders and 
the corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement, which 
also restricted the transfer of stock and gave the corporation a 
right of first refusal should any shareholder desire to dispose 
of his stock and the option to repurchase its stock at par value 
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in the event of the death of a shareholder or upon a 
shareholder's termination of employment by the corporation. 
Dr. Nilsson became involved in several unsuccessful 
investments, culminating in his filing for bankruptcy in 1976. 
On November 20, 1981, the bankruptcy trustee applied to the 
bankruptcy court for authorization to sell Dr. Nilsson's 1,000 
shares of stock in the corporation to Dr. Michaelson fXDr $1,000. 
This amount represented the par value of the shares and the 
amount for which the corporation would be entitled to redeem the 
shares, pursuant to the stock redemption agreement, in the event 
it were entitled to redeem. Riche, a creditor of Dr. Nilsson 
holding a judgment for $120,000.00, objected and asked the 
bankruptcy court to require the trustee to force a dissolution of 
the corporation so that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate could 
receive his share of the total assets of the corporation. 
The bankruptcy court rejected both suggestions. Instead, 
the court authorized a sale of the stock to the highest bidder 
and, on August 12, 1982, conducted a sale of the stock. The 
bidding proceeded in stages until Riche bid $2,600 and Dr. 
Michaelson refused to make a higher bid. The court authorized 
the sale of Dr. Nilsson*s shares to Riche for that amount. In 
doing so, the bankruptcy court in no way ruled on the validity of 
the transfer or value of the stock and expressly made the sale 
-subject toH any applicable restrictions in the stock redemption 
agreement and articles of incorporation and all applicable 
provisions of state law. 
Upon sale of the stock to Riche, the corporation tendered 
$1,000 to Riche, the par value of the shares of stock purchased' 
from the trustee, in contemplation of the stock redemption 
agreement. Riche rejected the tender and made demand upon the 
corporation for the issuance of the 1,000 shares of stock, 
redemption of his shares in the corporation for their fair market 
value, a corporate financial statement, and an opportunity to 
inspect a copy of the corporate minutes, bylaws, and articles of 
incorporation. The corporation refused to comply with Riche's 
demands and reiterated its perceived right to repurchase the 
stock at par value. 
Riche then filed an action in district court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987), which provides that, absent a 
redemption provision to the contrary, a professional corporation 
has 90 days within which to purchase the shares of a disqualified 
shareholder at their "reasonable fair value.- Absent such 
purchase, an action may be filed to obtain the -reasonable fair 
value" of the shares or the corporation's dissolution. Id. 
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Following trial, the court found that once Riche purchased 
all the rights, title, and interest that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy 
estate had in the 1,000 shares of stock, Riche was entitled, 
under both the stock redemption agreement and § 16-11-13, to have 
his shares redeemed for their reasonable fair value. The court 
found that dissolution was the only viable solution. It ordered 
defendant corporation to be immediately dissolved and to have all 
its assets.marshalled, its legal liabilities paid, and the 
balance of its assets distributed to the shareholders in the same 
ratio as their respective stock ownerships. The court also 
entered judgment against the corporation for reasonable attorney 
fees as required by the statute. See id. 
On «ppeal, the corporation argues that the court erred in 
ordering its dissolution because it had a right to redeem its 
stock pursuant to the stock redemption agreement and its articles 
of incorporation. It claims that Riche, as someone who is not a 
member of the medical profession, was entitled to $1,000, the par 
value of the shares, and not the reasonable fair value of the 
shares. 
The corporation also argues that § 16-11-13 only applies in 
the absence of a private agreement and that since the corporation 
provided for the redemption of shares in its stock repurchase 
agreement, the statute is inapplicable.1 
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT 
The court found that Riche purchased the stock subject to 
the provisions of the stock redemption agreement. The court 
noted that the agreement protected the doctors from undesirable 
associates, namely non-doctors, by prohibiting the sale or 
transfer of stock to anyone who was not a member of the medical 
profession. However, the court found the redemption agreement to 
be ambiguous in at least two respects:2 (1) It did not define 
1. Each party also asserts statute of limitations arguments 
against the other. We agree with the trial court that these 
contentions are without merit. 
2. When a contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to 
find facts respecting the intention of the parties based on 
extrinsic evidence, our review is limited, Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985), and we will not disturb the findings 
and judgment so long as they are based on "substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence." Car Doctor Inc. v. Belmont, 635 
P.2d 82, 83-84 (Utah 1981). However, the threshold question of 
whether or not a contract actually is ambiguous is a question of 
law. Faulker v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
the redemption price in that "par value** was not given a 
numerical value in the agreement, and (2) its elaborate 
provisions governing notices and procedures were "wholly 
inconsistent with valuing Dr. Nilsson's interest at only 
$1,000"; therefore, the parties must not have really meant Mpar 
value" in the technical sense with respect to the redemption 
arrangement contained in the agreement. We disagree. 
As to thfi first point, the Utah Business Corporation Act 
provides that the articles of incorporation shall set forth the 
classes of shares and state their par value. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-49 (1987). The Professional Corporation Act provides 
that "articles of incorporation shall meet the requirements of 
the Utah Business Corporation Act." Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-4 
(1987). Therefore, under the Professional Corporation Act read 
in conjunction with the Utah Business Corporation Act, 
defendant's articles of incorporation would be the appropriate 
vehicle for defining the par value of the stock. The 
definition of par value in the corporation's articles is, in 
affect, incorporated into the stock redemption agreement.3 
The stock redemption agreement was not ambiguous with respect 
to the meaning of par value since "par value" is a term of art 
and the document which should state par value did so 
unambi guously. 
As to the second point, we frankly do not find in the 
agreement "extensive notices" or "procedural steps" which are 
in any way inconsistent with "par value" meaning par value. It 
is true the agreement gives the corporation the option of 
paying the par value redemption over the course of a year, 
which seems peculiar in the instant case where only $1,000 
would arguably be payable. However, the articles authorized 
3. [W]henever "two or more instruments are executed by the 
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject 
matter," courts should interpret them "together so far as 
determining the respective rights and interests of the parties, 
although they do not in terms refer to each other." Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 
(1972) . 
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the issuance of 50,000 shares. A schedule of payments seems 
unnecessary if the corporation need pay only $1,000 to redeem, 
but it would be quite important if all the authorized stock 
were issued and $25,000 or so had to be paid to redeem a 
shareholder's stock. This possibility, not an aberrant notion 
of "par value," appears to explain this provision. Nor has 
Riche called to our attention any evidence that would support 
the trial court's conclusion that the corporation really meant 
something other than par value when it used that term in the 
stock redemption agreement. 
It does not follow, however, that the court's judgment 
was in error. For reasons somewhat different than those relied 
on by the trial court, its judgment is readily sustainable.4 
STOCK RESTRICTIONS 
Professional corporations are unique in some 
respects.5 They are designed to allow "members of certain 
professions the opportunity to practice together and enjoy the 
tax and other advantages of the corporate form." Central State 
Bank v. Albright, 12 Kan. 2d 175, 737 P.2d 65, 66-67 (Ct. App. 
1987). See Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987). " [Legislation 
extending the power to incorporate to professionals seeks to 
assure that corporate control will remain with persons" 
licensed in the profession, and bound by the same professional 
4. See, e,qtt Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 
894-95 (Utah 1988). 
5. This court recently confronted another aspect of their 
uniqueness, which results from the Professional Corporation 
Act's "purpose of making available to professional persons the 
benefits of the corporate form for the business aspects of 
their practices while preserving the established professional 
aspects of the personal relationship between the professional 
person and those he serves." Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987). 
See Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(shareholder in law firm organized as professional corporation 
not vicariously liable for malpractice committed by another 
shareholder unless personally involved in malpractice). 
Although the Court's order or some notice thereof has not been 
published, we are advised the Utah Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in Stewart v. Coffman. 
standards and ethics, by restricting the sale or transfer of 
stock to members of the profession. Central State Bank v. 
Albright, 737 P.2d at 67. 
In this case, state law, the corporation's articles, and 
the stock redemption agreement all prohibit the transfer of 
shares in the corporation to persons not licensed in the 
medical profession. Section 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Ace provides: 
A professional corporation may issue the 
shares of its capital stock only to 
persons who are duly licensed to render 
the same specific professional services as 
those for which the corporation was 
organized. A shareholder may voluntarily 
transfer his shares in a professional 
corporation only to a person who is duly 
licensed to render the same specific 
professional services as those for which 
the corporation was organized. Any shares 
issued in violation of this section are 
void. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-7 (1987) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the corporation's articles of incorporation 
provide: 
The transfer and conveyance of this stock 
shall be restricted in that such stock may 
be issued, sold or transferred only to a 
person or persons who are duly licensed to 
render medical services; any other 
transfer or issuance of shares shall be 
void. 
The corporation's stock repurchase agreement contains an 
equivalent restriction. 
Although the statute, the articles, and the agreement 
prohibit the transfer of stock to anyone who is not a member of 
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the medical profession, these prohibitions did not preclude the 
transfer in this case. Restrictions on the sale of corporate 
stock are held to apply only to "voluntary" transfers. See, 
e.g. , Castonguav v. Castonguay, 306 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. 1981) 
(stock restrictions did not apply to court-ordered assignment 
pursuant to judgment of divorce). Indeed, this doctrine has 
apparently been incorporated in § 16-11-7, quoted above, which 
expressly refers only to voluntary transfers. 
The same result is reached in this case by giving the 
corporation's stock repurchase agreement its plain meaning. The 
agreement does not even purport to restrict involuntary transfers 
of stock, such as the one in the instant case which occurred 
pursuant to a court-ordered trustee's sale. See Durkee v. Durkee 
Mower, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1981). The restrictions 
in the stock redemption agreement only concern (1) transfers upon 
the death of a shareholder and (2) voluntary transfers during 
life. The agreement simply does not address involuntary 
transfers during life.6 "[T]he scope of the restriction cannot 
be greater than its actual language." Durkee v. Durkee-Mower, 
Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 142. Accordingly, "[w]e refuse to expand the 
clear and unambiguous language of the corporate stock restriction 
and hold it applicable to a situation not provided for when 
drafted." id. 
Once a disqualified person,7 like Riche, acquires stock by 
an involuntary transfer, the usual remedy is to compel 
dissolution of the corporation pursuant to the applicable 
statute. See generally Gulf Mortgage & Realty Investments v. 
Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090, 1095-96 (1980). 
STATUTORY SCHEME 
A professional corporation may provide, through its articles 
of incorporation, bylaws, or private agreement, for the 
repurchase or redemption of shares upon the death or 
disqualification of a shareholder. Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 
(1987). In the absence of such a provision, the repurchase or 
redemption of shares must be accomplished pursuant to the 
statutory scheme provided in § 16-11-13. 
6. Accordingly, we need not reach the question of whether, and 
to what extent, intended restrictions on involuntary transfers 
might be enforceable. 
7. "Qualification" and "disqualification" refer, in this sense, 
to whether a shareholder is qualified to hold stock in the 
professional corporation, i.e., whether he or she is duly 
licensed as a member of the profession. 
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In this case, the corporation's articles merely recited that 
the statutory scheme would govern in the event of death or 
disqualification of a shareholder. However, the corporation 
subsequently entered into an agreement providing for the 
redemption at par value of shares held by a shareholder at death 
or upon a shareholder's termination of employment. The agreement 
does not provide for redemption in the event of disqualification, 
whether following the involuntary transfer to an unqualified 
person or the subsequent disqualification of a formerly qualified 
shareholder.8 
Since the corporation did not provide in its articles, in 
its bylaws, or by private agreement for the repurchase or 
redemption of shares upon the disqualification of a shareholder, 
the statutory procedure set forth in § 16-11-13 governs the 
repurchase or redemption of shares in this case. That provision 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[T]he professional corporation shall 
purchase the shares of a deceased 
shareholder or a shareholder no longer 
qualified to own shares in such 
corporation within 90 days after the death 
or disqualification of the shareholder, as 
the case may be. The price for such 
share[s] shall be their reasonable fair 
value as of the date of death or 
disqualification of the shareholder. If 
the corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shares by the end of said 90 days, 
then . . . any disqualified shareholder 
may bring an action in . . . district 
court . . . for the enforcement of this 
provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987). The statute further authorizes 
the court to order the liquidation of the corporation, id., which 
was done in this case. 
8. An unqualified transferee is treated the same as a 
once-qualified shareholder who becomes disqualified. See also 
Street v. Superman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). See also 
Note 7, supra. 
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The judgment appealed from was properly entered and is 
affirmed. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD A. RICHE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah Pro-
fessional corporation, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting 
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for 
plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, 
Jr. appearing as attorneys for defendant. This was an action 
brought by plaintiff to obtain an accounting and order of dissolu-
tion of defendant corporation pursuant to Utah Code Section 
16-11-13. The Court having heard and examined the evidence, 
both oral and documentary, introduced by the parties hereto, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, and having taken the 
matter under advisement for the purpose of consideration, now 
finds and decides as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86158 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant's articles of incorporation, retirement 
plan, Leases and the stock redemption agreement were prepared 
by Attorney Paul Hansen. They were executed on or ibcut the 
dates generated. 
2. The defendant is a legal, bona fide professional 
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah and is and was 
recognized as such in the community for the purpose of providing 
medical services in exchange for fees charged and collected. 
3. Said corporation was created and structured primarily 
for tax purposes. 
4. The defendant corporation has considerable assets 
in the form of leases, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, 
medical paraphernalia and all accounts receivable generated 
by the services of past and present corporate employees and/or 
the professional corporations of Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson. 
Notwithstanding the validity to the general public of the defend-
ant corporation, the two doctors as between themselves, did 
not regard the formal paperwork of the corporation as a change 
in their relationship. Among themselves, each doctor understood 
he would claim from the corporation his receivables and one-
half of Dr. Paul's generated receivables after all normal operating 
costs were paid. 
5. The Articles of Incorporation provide that 50,000 
shares might be issued. The corporate records show that as 
of the date of Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy the following shares were 
outstanding: Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 shares, Dr. Paul, 10 shares, 
and Dr. :iichaeison, 1,000 shares. 
6. This Court finds that there were no formal shareholder 
meetings and/or director meetings. 
7. Since incorporation, the entire receivables generated 
by the services of Drs. Michaelson, Nilsson and Paul and/or 
their related professional corporations, are the properties 
of the defendant. Said doctors have been paid a fixed wage 
or draw, but that said wage or draw was calculated to be less 
than ^heir respective billings, so that there would be sufficient 
funds for other corporate purposes such as retirement plans 
and appropriate bonuses. 
8. Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson owned in North Ogden 
certain real property held in a partnership. This improved 
real property was the facility in which the corporation conducted 
its business. The lease was adjusted from time to time in order 
to affect the most desirable tax results for the two doctors. 
Dr. Paul did not enjoy the benefits of ownership in the real 
property. 
9. Initially the defendant corporation provided a retire-
ment plan for Dr. Nilsson and subsequently retirement plans 
were arranged for both doctors through their individual professional 
corporations. All business transactions between the various 
entities and doctors were always considered in connection with 
their respective tax consequences and the creditor problems 
of Dr. Nilsson. Examples of such planning and close association 
between the two principal doctors are as follows: (1) A partner-
ship practice prior to incorporation; (2) The formulation of the 
defendant corporation; (3) the formation of the real estate 
partnership; (4) the formation of individual retirement plans; 
(5) the formation of individual professional corporations, 
and (6) assistance and protection Dr. Michaelson gave Dr. Nilsson 
by purchasing delinquent trust deed notes on Dr. Nilsson's home 
and other real estate interests. Dr. Nilsson's individual examples 
consisted of the following: (1) His sale to his retirement 
fund of his coin collection, which cost him $130,000 for $30,000. 
This resulted in a tax loss in 1974 and substantial economic 
benefits to his retirement fund and further avoidance of his 
creditors. (2) Just prior to have had placed substantial judgments 
against Dr. Nilsson, he granted substantial trust deeds on his 
home and other real estate holdings to favored parties. (3) 
Dr. Nilsson1s bankruptcy schedules listed individual assets 
at inordinately low values. 
10. Years prior to bankruptcy, 1973, Dr. Nilsson 
reported substantial income and net worth in excess of $1,400,000. 
At the conclusion of the bankruptcy, the Trustee reported to 
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he had only been 
able to obtain less than $4,000 in assets. Two Thousand Six 
Hundred Dollars of that amount came from the plaintiff because 
of the purchase of the North Ogden Professional Corporation stock. 
11. Ken Jensen's records and exhibits are accepted 
by the Court with regard to the collectability, and receivable 
amounts Teneratea ov the respective employees throughout rhe 
relevant ^erioa of une corporation's existence. 
12. All the evidence of this case taken as a wnoie 
varrants a findma of fact that Dr. Nilsson and Dr. Michaelson 
iave jealously attempted to promote one another's well being. 
Further, tnat tne^ is no evidence of a falling out or opposing 
positions uaKen by Dr. Nilsson and/or Dr. Michaelson with regard 
zo one another and their respective welfare. The evidence is 
actually to tne opposite m the extreme. Insofar as Dr. Micnael-
son is concerned, nis efforts apoear to be totally honest. 
13. The Stock Redemption Agreement provided tnat 
Dr. Nilsson and Dr Michaelson would be protected from undesiraPle 
associates under the terms and conditions as provided oy the 
Agreement. 
14. The Court finds, nowever, ""hat the Stock Redemotion 
Agreement is ambiguous in at least two respects: (1) The Agree-
ment does not define the purchase price of the disposing partner's 
interest in that par value is not delineated with a numerical 
value. (2) The extensive notices, procedural steps, payment 
schedule and options available among the parties to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement are wholly inconsistent with valuing Dr. 
Nilsson's interest at only $1,000. 
15. All of the evidence, including but not limited 
to the jealous attempts on the part of the doctors to promote 
one another's welfare, their various interrelated business leases 
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and igreements, retirement plans, and the mutual understanding 
between the doctors relating to individual receivables leaves 
this Court to conclude and find that a disposing shareholder 
was to be deait with equitably under the terms of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Therefore, this Court finds that par 
value, as defined for purposes of the Redemption Agreement, 
meant market value. 
16. Although the Redemption Agreement provides for 
notices and procedural steps, no such steps or procedures were 
followed or taken by defendant. 
17. Dr. Richard E. Nilsson filed bankruptcy on July 8, 
1976. 
18. July 8, 1976, is the effective date that all 
of Dr. Nilsson's interest in the 1,000 shares, including the 
rights, privileges and values of the North Ogden Professional 
Corporation stock became subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee subsequently appointed. 
19. On August 12, 1982, this Court finds, Edward 
Riche legally purchased all right, title and interest Dr. Nilssonfs 
bankrupt estate had in the 1,000 shares of the North Ogden Profes-
sional Corporation. 
20. Therefore, after the purchase on August 12, 1982, 
Edward Riche was entitled under the Redemption Agreement and/or 
Code Section 16-11-13, to have his shares redeemed for reasonable 
fair market value. 
21. Prior to the Bankruptcy Court's sale of the 1,000 
shares uo plaintiff, Edward Riche, no determination or value 
reaarding the restriction or encumbrances relating to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was made. As a result of the purchase 
by plaintiff, Edward Riche, the Bankruptcy Court assigned all 
its right, title and interest to plaintiff and left this Court 
the right and responsibility to determine the value, encumbrances 
and/or restrictions, if any, with regard to the Stock Redemption 
.Agreement. 
22. Within appropriate time limits provided under 
the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or Code Section 16-11-13, 
Attorney John P. Sampson, on behalf of plaintiff, Edward Riche, 
made demand for the redemption of his shares for then-reasonable 
market -Talue. 
23. No reasonable market value was tendered by defend-
ant under the Stock Redemption Agreement nor under the terms 
and conditions of Code Section 16-11-13. Reasonable market 
value means 49.75% of all assets including, but not limited 
to, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, supplies, medical 
paraphernalia and accounts receivable less the costs of operating 
the clinic at any given time. 
24. There has been no redemption under the terms 
}f the Stock Redemption Agreement, or under the provisions of 
:ode Sec. 16-11-13. Therefore, under the terms of the Redemption 
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Agreement and Code Section 16-11-13 this Court concludes that 
all the evidence mandates that dissolution is the only viable 
solution under Utah law. Under the terms of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and the Utah Professional Corporation Act, the plaintiff 
may not continually maintain ownership of the 1,000 shares of 
North Ogden ProfeoS^onal Corporation stock. 
25. This Court concludes that the statute of limitations 
does not bar either party regarding their relative assertions. 
This Court concludes that the Trustee, during the bankruptcy 
period, had each party's contentions and assertions in litigation 
and, therefore, the statutory period of limitations was suspended 
during the bankruptcy period until the time of the sale and 
a reasonable period thereafter. 
26. The plaintiff, under the terms of Code Section 
16-11-13, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees to be determined 
by the parties by means of affidavit and/or a subsequent special 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The enactment of the Utah Professional Corporation 
Act was not intended to create any form of exemption beyond 
the exemption statutes of the State of Utah. Thus, a professional 
stock interest is subject to all normal bankruptcy statutes 
and creditor rights. 
2. This Court concludes that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement as a matter of law was ambiguous for the reasons stated 
above m d that par value as defined in the Stock Redemption 
Agreement meant reasonable market value. Furthermore, Code 
Section 16-11-13 also applies and required a redemption of plain-
tiff's 1,000 shares at reasonable market value. 
3. 'Plaintiff, Edward Riche, as a result of the purchase, 
owns all right, title and interest in the 1,000 shares of North 
Ogden Professional Corporation stock; that plaintifffs demand 
for redemption at a reasonable fair value was made timely under 
the :erns of the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or including 
Code Section 16-11-13. 
4. That the appropriate steps for redemption were 
HOC taken by defendant according to the terms of the Stock Redemp-
tion Agreement nor under provisions of Code Section 16-11-13. 
5. Since no redemption was made,the plaintiff is 
entitled to an Order from this Court to have defendant immediately 
dissolved, to have all the assets marshalled, accounted for, 
legal liabilities paid and the balance of the assets distributed 
to the shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock 
ownerships reflect, which are as follows: Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 
shares, Dr. Paul 10 shares, plaintiff Edward Riche,1,000 shares. 
6. Let judgment be entered against defendant for 
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined and 
provided for in the Findings of Fact. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ' ^ , day of September,-
1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;, postage prepaid, to Herschel J. 
Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr., WATKISS & CAiMPBELL, 310 South 
Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Pete 
N. Vlahos, VLAKOS, PERKINS & SHARP, 24 47 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 
84401. 
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The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting 
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for 
the plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, 
Jr. appearing as attorneys for the defendant. 
Trial was then conducted upon the issues raised in 
plaintifffs complaint and defendant's answer. 
Wherefore, the Court having heard the evidence, and 
finding the evidence sufficient to warrant judgment in favor 
of plaintiff, and having made and entered its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, now gives judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff, 
Edward A. Riche, is the sole owner of all rights, title and interest 
in the 1,000 shares of North Ogden Professional Corporation 
stock. 
IT 13 FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff's demand for redemption at a reasonable fair value 
was made timely under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement 
and/or the provisions of Code Section 16-11-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: the 
defendant did not take the appropriate steps for redemption under 
the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, nor did the defendant 
comply with the reasonable terms of Code Section 16-11-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant 
corporation be ordered immediately dissolved in that plaintiff, 
along with an appropriate representative of the remaining shareholder 
are hereby ordered to marshall all assets, provide for all legal 
liabilities, and the balance of said assets to be distributed 
to shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock 
ownerships were reflected at trial: Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 shares, D] 
Paul, 10 shares, and plaintiff, Edward A. Riche, 1,000 shares. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain-
tiff is awarded judgment for court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees as determined by affidavit and agreement among the parties1 
counsel. / ,1 \ 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this first day of July, 1970, by and 
between Richard E. Nilsson, M.D., Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D., 
and David W. Paul, M.D. , hereinafter called the "Stockholders" 
and the North Ogden Professional Corporation hereinafter called 
the "Company". 
WHEREAS, the Stockholders own stock in the Company 
as follows: 
STOCKHOLDER 
Richard E. Nilsson, M.D. 
Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D, 
David W. Paul, M.D. 
COMMON STOCK 
1,000 shares 
1,000 shares 
10 shares 
and desire to express their agreement regarding their rights and 
obligations as Stockholders of the Company; and, 
WHEREAS, the Stockholders and the Company desiie to provide 
an arrangement whereby In the event of the death of any one of the 
Stockholders, the survivors of them shall own the Company, 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED: 
1. Restriction on SLock. If any Stockholder at any time 
2 DEFENDANT'S 
C Y U M I T 
desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any of his stock 
of the Company, or if any Stockholder shall terminate his employment 
by the Company, he shall offer all his stock to the Company at par 
value by written notice addressed to the principal office of the 
Company. 
A Stockholder shall be deemed to have terminated his employ-
ment at the end of four (4) months continuous absence from the business 
without approval and shall be deemed to have made written offer of his 
stock to the Company at the expiration of such period, excluding 
absences with the permission and consent of the Company. Within thirty 
(30) days after receipt of such offer, tne Company may deliver written 
notice of acceptance of such offer to the offering Stockholder at his 
residence, fixing a closing date for the purchase of the stock not 
more than thirty (30) days thereafter, or, alternatively the Company 
may within such period deliver written notice to the offering Stockholder 
that it is being dissolved and liquidated. If the Company elects either 
of these courses, the offering Stockholder shall vote and take any other 
necessary action in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholders 
(or, if there is more than one remaining Stockholder, the Stockholder or 
Stockholders owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to 
effectuate the will of the Company. It is expressly stipulated, however, 
that the Company shall have the right not to pursue either of these 
courses, in which event the offering Stockholder may dispose of his 
stock to any other physician approved by the Company who is employed by 
the Company, free of the restrictions of this agreement: or, alternatively, 
he may call a meeting of the Stockholders and Directors, within sixty (60) 
days after the Company!s receipt of the original offer, at which he 
may vote all the shares of the Company held by him and by the other 
Stockholders in favor of immediate dissolution, the offering Stock-
holder being deemed to hold a proxy for this purpose. 
2. Death of Stockholder, After the death of any one of 
the Stockholders while owning stock in the Company, the Company shall 
be dissolved unless it shall elect to purchase at par value all the 
stock of the Compan}' owned by the decedent at the time of his death, 
giving written notice of its election to the executors or administra-
tors of the decedent* hereinafter called the persona] representatives, 
and to the decedent's surviving widow, within sixty (60) days after 
appointment of such personal representatives. In the event the Company 
elects to purchase the stock of the decedent, it shall fix a closing 
date not more than thirty (30) days after its giving of the foregoing 
notice, and the personal representatives of the decedent and the dece-
dent's widow shall be obliged to sell their stock on the terms herein-
after provided. The personal representatives of the deceased Stockholder 
and his surviving widow shall vote and take any other necessary action 
in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholder (or if there 
is more than one remaining stockholder, the Stockholder or Stockholders 
owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to effectuate the 
will of the Company. 
3. Free Transferability of Stock. A Stockholder may transfer 
all or any portion of his stock to any person qualified by the Articles 
of Incorporation to be a stockholder; provided, however, that the Stock-
holder desiring to transfer ail or any portion of his shares first 
shall advise the Company of the proposed transfer. Prior to any such 
sale, the Company shall have the option to redeem the said stock at 
the par value. If said option is not exercised by the Company within 
fifteen (15) days after notice to it of the proposed sale, the Stock-
holder shall be free to sell said stock to said transferee. 
4, Purchase Price. For the purpose of Paragraph 1 and 2 
above, the purchase price of all the stock of the Company shall be par 
value. 
5* Payment of Purchase Price. Payment of the purchase price 
to be paid by the Company for the stock of a Stockholder in thp circum-
stances provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be made as follows: 
(a) In case of a purchase under Paragraph 1, at the options 
of the Company either in a lump sum on the closing or one-third (1/3) 
shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company, the balance in two (2) 
equal non-interest bearing installments payable six (6) months and 
twelve (12) months respectively, after the closing; payment must be made 
in cash. 
(b) In case of a purchase under Paragraph 2, the entire amount 
shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company in a lump sum or in not 
to exceed five (5) equal non-interest bearing installments, the first paya-
ble at the closing and succeeding installments payable six (6), twelve (12), 
eighteen (18), and twenty-four (24) months after such closing. 
If the surplus of the Company is insufficient for the Company to 
purchase its stock, the Company and its officers and stockholders shall 
promptly take all necessary steps to reduce the capital stock of che 
Company to the extent required. 
6/ Obligations Pending Payment, Pending full payment of the 
purchase price as provided for in Paragraph 4 above: 
(a) The sellers or their personal representatives shall deposit 
their stock at the closing with an escrow agent of his, or their, choice, 
deliverable against final payment. 
(b) The Company's policies and operations shall be governed by 
the following: (1) the nature of the Company's business will not be 
altered, and such business will be conducted and property will be sold, and 
commitments made, only in the ordinary course: (2) no dividend or other 
distributions will be declared or paid; (3) the level of compensation 
paid employees or officers shall not be increased unless warranted by 
increased business. 
7. Endorsement on Stock Certificates. During the continuance of 
this agreement, all stock certificates of .the Company shall bear an endorse-
ment as follows: 
"This certificate is held subject to the terms of an 
agreement, dated the day of 19 , a copy of which 
is on file at the principal office of the Company in Ogden, 
Utah. 
8. Arbitration. Any controversy arising under this agreement 
shall be settled in Ogden, Utah, by arbitration under the rules then 
existing of the American Arbitration Association; provided, however, that 
arbitration will not be exclusive remedy: and if the parties must retain 
attorneys to resolve such controversy, the party determined to be at 
fault or in breach shall pay all reasonable attorney's fees of the other 
party. 
9* Benefit. This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit 
of the parties, their personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this instrument 
the day and year first above written. 
STOCKHOLDERS 
Richara E, Nilsson ^  -
f§N:t%a! U/JfJ/lfA/A 
"CoauhcTey D. Micliaelson V 
David W. Paul 
COMPANY 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Chauncey D./Michaelsony President 
ATTEST: 
P . 
S MxlJMM- ^ ^ 
Richard E. NiJsson, M.D 
Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Comes now counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent and 
certifies to the Court that ten (10) copies of the Respondent's 
Brief were hand-carried to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, 332 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 
34114, and that four (4) copies were hand-carried to Pete N. 
Vlahos and F. Kim Walpole, attorneys for Defendant\Appellant, 
rOl this *2_J < 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, UT 844 day of April, 1989, 
rOHN P. SAMB80N 
attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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